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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
constitutional federalism as recognized by both Hamilton and
Madison—the preservation of the States' sovereignty over their re-
spective spheres of authority.
ROBERT THOMAS MORGAN
Constitutional Law — Freedom of Speech and Association — Gov-
ernment Employees—Elrod v. Burns.' In December, 1970, petitioner
Richard Elrod, a Democrat, replaced Republican Joseph Woods as
Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois. 2
 The Sheriff's Office is staffed by
approximately three thousand employees, half of whom are "'merit'
employees" protected from discharge without cause: After taking of-
fice as Sheriff, Elrod continued the long-standing local practice of dis-
charging the vast majority of noncivil service opposition party em-
ployees and replacing them with employees who shared his political
affiliations. When Elrod instituted this practice, three discharged em-
ployees and one employee threatened with discharge brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 4 They alleged that. the pa-
tronage system of employment as practiced by Sheriff Elrod in combi-
nation with Mayor Richard J. Daley, 5
 the Democratic Organization of
Cook County, and the Democratic Central Committee of Cook
County° violated their first and fourteenth amendment. rights, and
tional Labor Relations Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (1970), are constitutionally suspect in
light of National League of Cities. Such a direct federal regulation of State and local gov-
ernmental employer-employee relationships might be considered by the Supreme Court
more intrusive of' state sovereignty than the congressional extension of the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions in the 1974 FLSA amendments. See ABA,
SEurtoN OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW. Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, Part I: Federal
Regulation of the Public Sector (Jan. 1977) for a more extensive discussion of the implica-
tions of National League of Cities on proposed federal regulation of state public sector
labor relations.
' 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
2 id, at 350.
3 See id. at 377 (Powell, j., dissenting),
4 1d. at 349-350. The discharged respondents included the Chief Deputy of the
Process Division, who supervised various departments of' the office, a bailiff and a se-
curity guard at the juvenile court, and an "employee." let at 350-51.
Mayor Daley's involvement was grounded in part upon his position as leader of'
the party organization in Cook County. Appendix at 6. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976).
" Plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy on the part of all the defendants to carry out the
unlawful firings. Defendants allegedly effectuated the conspiracy
(a) By screening the political party affiliation of the nteinbers of plaintiff
class. (b) By soliciting members of plaintiff class to meet the conditions
[for continuing employment, such as obtaining sponsorship letters, shifting
party affiliation and the like]. (c) By supplying letters of recommendation
or approval, commonly known as patronage letters, to certain members of
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contravened 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988. 7
 The district
court denied injunctive relief, 8 and subsequently dismissed respon-
dents' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
plaintiffs class who have been coerced into meeting the conditions [for
continuing employment]. (d) By screening and/or supplying patronage
letters to replacements or potential replacements of the employees who are
members of plaintiffs class who have been or are about 10 be unlawfully
fired. (e) By actively encouraging and soliciting Defendant Richard J.
Elrod to pursue the unlawful practices described [earlier in the complaint].
Appendix at 6, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
7
 427 U.S. at 350, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any ... custom, or usage, of any
State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Conititution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) provides, in pertinent part: 	 ,
If two or more persons in any Slate ... conspire ... for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of' persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws ... or ... to prevent by Force, intimidation or threat, any
citizen who is lawffilly entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy
in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qual-
ified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member
of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person on
property or account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of such conspiracy, whereby
another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and
exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party
so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages,
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the
conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to
be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be com-
mitted, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission
of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be commit-
ted, shall be liable to the party injured .. , for all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have pre-
vented
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides, in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the dis-
trict courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protec-
tion or all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and their vindi-
cation, shall he exercised and enfOrced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so kir as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect;
but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient.
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish of-
fenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the con-
stitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsisitent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
" Burns v. Elrod, Civil No. 71 C 607 (N.D. 111. 1971). The district court opinion is
u npublished.
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granted.° On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed" and held that
plaintiffs' allegations that they had been the victims of patronage
dismissals'' stated a valid claim. The court further instructed the dis-
trict court to enter preliminary injunctive relief." In so doing, the
court of appeals followed its earlier decision in Illinois State Employees
Union, Council 34 v. Lewis," where it had held that patronage dismis-
sals of nonpolicymaking public employees impermissibly violated first
amendment freedoms. 14
The Supreme Court, in a plurality decision, affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's decision and HELD: Patronage dismissals of non-
policymaking public employees constitute an impermissible infringe-
ment on the first amendment freedoms of expression and association,
for which injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy." The Court
reached this decision first by disposing of petitioners' claims that the
case was not justiciable, then by balancing the extent to which patron-
age dismissals inhibit the exercise of first amendment freedoms
against legitimate state objectives advanced to justify such dismissals.
Invoking this traditional balancing test," the Court concluded that
patronage dismissals of nonpolicymaking public employees neither
sufficiently advanced vital state objectives to outweigh the loss to free-
doms of expression and association nor constituted the least restrictive
means to the state ends involved)?
This note will focus on three facets of the Court's decision in
Elrod. First, this note will examine the Court's disposition of the
threshold questions posed by the political question, separation of
5 Burns v. Elrod, Civil No. 71 C 607 (N.D. III. 1972).
1 " Burns v. Elrod, 509 F,2d 1133, 1136-37 (7th Cir. 1975).
" "Patronage dismissals," for the purposes of this note, are defined as the dis-
charge of public employees For partisan politi©l reasons—either to make room for re-
placements who are affiliates of another political party, or to penalize the employee's
failure to support sufficiently the partisan political activities of the employee's superiors.
12 509 F,2d at 1136.
" 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973); cert. denied sub
nom Lewis v. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
14 473 F.2d at 574. Illinois State Employees Union was decided after the dismissal of
the respondents' complaint by the district court. In Illinois State Employees Union, plain-
tiffs including building employees, clerical workers and license examiners employed in
the office of the Illinois Secretary of State alleged that they had been dismissed from
their positions because they had refused to affiliate with or support the Republican
party. Id. at 563. The court held that patronage dismissals infringed first amendment
freedoms, id. at 576, and were impermissible where the dismissals involved positions in
which neither "considerations of personal loyalty ... (nor) determination of policy" was
involved. Id. at 574. See Comment, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political
justifications, 41 U. Ci-u, L. REV. 297, 315-317 (1974).
.	 15 427 U.S. at 372-74. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall,
authored the plurality opinion. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Blackmun, filed an
opinion concurring in the result. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist and the
Chief, Justice, filed a dissenting opinion, and the Chief justice added a separate dissent.
Justice Stevens took no part in the decision.
"See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 25 (1976) (per curiam); United States
Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973).
" 427 U.S. at 364-69.
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powers and waiver doctrines. Then, the note will analyze the Court's
determination that patronage dismissals .of nonpolicymaking public
employees impermissibly constrain first amendment freedoms. Finally,
the note will discuss the impact of Elrod on patronage practices at all
levels of American government, and will conclude that while the pre-
cise holding in Elrod is not likely to weaken significantly the institution
of patronage or the party structure, it may well serve as a springboard
from which to attack a variety of patronage practices at all levels of
government.
1. THRESHOLD QUESTIONS: JUSTICIABILITY AND WAIVER
Before proceeding to a consideration of the merits in Elrod, the Court
summarily disposed of two threshold objections to the justiciability of the
controversy raised by petitioners, founded on the political question doc-
trine and on the theory of the separation of powers.' 8 Petitioners also raised
a third objection to the Court's consideration of the controversy, arguing
that respondents had waived their right to object to patronage dismissals.
This section will first consider the Court's disposition of the justiciability
questions, and then will analyze the Court's discussion of waiver.
A. The Political Question Doctrine and the Separation of Powers
The Court hag generally invoked the doctrines of political ques-
tion and separation of powers to determine whether the legislative or
executive branch of government rather than the judiciary ought to re-
solve the issue in question.'" The Court's refusal to resolve issues
deemed to involve political questions or the separation of powers is
grounded in the Court's unwillingness to encroach upon the legiti-
mate prerogatives of other branches of government. 2 " Petitioners ar-
gued that the political question doctrine barred the Court's considera-
tion of the controversy because patronage dismissals involved the
State's electoral process." Therefore, petitioners claimed that the
legislative branch, rather than the judiciary, should resolve the ques-
tion of the permissibility of the dismissals. 22 In addition, petitioners
maintained that the theory of separation of powers also precluded
judicial review because judicial oversight of patronage dismissals
would impede the executive's prompt fulfillment of his duties by fore-
"I The Court, recognizing the close relationship between these two justiciability
issues, has observed that the "nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a func-
tion of the separation of powers." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). See Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969).
" See notes 25-27 infra.
cf. P. BATOR. P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO. & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL. COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 233 (2d ed. 1973) ("the political departments
or the electorate ought to have the final say.").
" See 427 U.S.•at 351-52.
" Id. at 352.
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ing the executive to allow undesirable subordinates to continue in
public employment."
The Court concluded that neither doctrine precluded judicial
review. 24 In each case, the Court noted that respondents challenged
the actions of state officials whereas both the political question25 and
separation of powers doctrines have traditionally applied only in situa-
tions involving an allocation by the Constitution of decisionmaking au-
thority to a coordinate branch of the federal government." The
Court further suggested that even if the case had involved federal of-
ficials, it nevertheless would be justiciable because it presented the




25 Id. The Court distinguished the political question doctrine which renders a
case nonjusticiable, from cases simply implicating the elective process. Id. The Court has
frequently considered "political" cases which involve the electoral process. See, e.g.,
Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (state legislative reapportionment); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927) (damage action brought against State Judges of
Election For denial of right to vote). Political questions arise in certain clearly-defined
situations:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; or the impossibility or a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from mul-
.	 tifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (1962).
25
 427 U.S. at 352. When the constitutionality of actions of state officials is chal-
lenged, the Court has repeatedly rejected the applicability of the political question doc-
trine. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-27, 229 (1962); McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1892).
The Chief Justice, in dissent, objected that the decision in Elrod constituted judi-
cial encroachment on state prerogatives inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and
the Court's recent direction in National League of Cities v. Usety, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The objections raised by the Chief
Justice, however, are founded not in the separation of powers, but in considerations of
federalism which he maintains should be considered whenever limitations of state activ-
ity are in issue. Id. at 376. The Chief Justice takes the position that "the issue is not so
much whether the patronage system is 'good' or 'bad,' but whether the choice of its
use in the management of ... [State) government ... was ... 'reserved to the States
..'Id. in light of the Court's conclusion that the question is whether a public official
has exceeded his constitutional authority, it is difficult to see how the Court should con-
clude that considerations of federalism, taken alone, ought to preclude review. See note
27 infra and accompanying text.
Y 7 427 U.S. at 352-53. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969),
citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) ("[lit is the responsibility of this Court to
act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.")
Thus, even where the authority to dismiss subordinates has been committed to a




Petitioners raised an added threshold question by arguing that
when respondents accepted their patronage positions they had waived
their right to object when discharged by a new administration." The
dissent agreed, and would have held that these respondents were not
the proper plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of the patron-
age system." Addressing the waiver argument in a footnote, the plur-
ality concluded that a finding of waiver would be totally unacceptable."
The Court reasoned that to allow a finding of waiver necessarily pre-
supposes the permissibility of that to be waived. The waiver of
privilege against self-incrimination" or the right to counsel, 32 for ex-
ample, is founded on the recognition that a citizen may constitution-
ally incriminate himself' or appear in a criminal action without, counsel
if' he so chooses. Here, however, a finding of waiver would operate to
allow the State to condition public employment on party affiliation, in
the face of the Court's holding that a partisan job qualification im-
permissibly infringes first amendment freedoms."
The plurality's resolution of the waiver issue seems reasonable,
since reliance on the doctrine of waiver to preclude challenges to pa-
tronage dismissals would raise several conceptual and concomitant fac-
tual difficulties. For example, the waiver argument depends on the
premise that each respondent accepted his public employment posi-
tion with the understanding that the employment depended in large
whether the coequal branch has exceeded its constitutional authority, despite claims that
the political questions or separation of power doctrines preclude review. See, e.g., Powell
v. McCormak, 395 U.S. 486, 520-21, 548-49 (1969) (The Court may determine
whether the refusal of the House of Representatives to seat a Congressman violated
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cls. I and 2); Humphrey's Ex'r. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
629 (1935) (Congressional limitation of President's power to remove quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial officers did not infringe constitutional powers of the President under U.S.
CONST. art. II, §§ I and 2). Rut cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926)
(Congressional limitation of President's powers to remove purely executive officers in-
fringed constitutional powers of the President under U.S. CONST, art. 11, §§ 1 and 2).
28 427 U.S. at 380-81 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in rimencan Fed'n of State, County and Mon. Em-
ployees a. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971), applied a similar argument to refuse
equitable relief to dismissed nonpolicymaking state employees who had benelitted from
the patronage system. There the court concluded that "Whose who ... live by the polit-
ical sword must be prepared to die by the political sword." Id. at 536, 280 A.2d at 378.
See Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005
(1975). But cf, Illinois State Employees Union, 473 F.2d at 573 -74.
29 427 U.S.at 381 & n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent suggests that those in-
itially denied employment for partisan reasons might inore legitimately assert the con-
stitutional claims. Id. See notes 107.112 infra and accompanying text.
3" 427 U.S. at 359-60 n.13.
3 ' See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. i37, 150 (1949).
' 2 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465-66 (1938),
" 427 U.S. at 359-60 n.13. See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968)
(The state may not "coerce a waiver of the immunity [from self-incrimination) it confers
on penalty of the loss of employment"); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926)(The state may not "compel the surrender of a right
in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold").
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part upon partisan concerns, and was likely to terminate if a new
party assumed power. 34 The implications of such a general premise,
however, may not be warranted in all factual circumstances. For ex-
ample, in Elrod, respondents were Republicans who took office during
a Republican administration rather than at its inception. When they
were later dismissed by Democrats for failure to change their party
affiliation, it is arguable that their discharges in fact resulted from
their refusal to waive their first amendment rights." An added con-
ceptual difficulty would emerge from a finding that the doctrine of
waiver prevents public employees from asserting their first amend-
ment rights, since it would seem to ignore the possibility that a citizen
has the right to revoke a waiver of constitutional rights." A majority
of the Court thus found that the state could not circumvent the con-
stitutional impermissibility of patronage dismissals by claiming that the
victims of such dismissals had waived their right to object. By adopt-
ing this result-oriented approach, the Court seems to have foreclosed
the defense of waiver even where the facts of a case might clearly jus-
tify a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver."
II. FIRST AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENT
This section will discuss three aspects of the Court's considera-
tion of the first amendment concerns in Elrod. Initially, it will examine
the Court's determination that patronage dismissals infringe the first
amendment freedoms of expression and association. Then it will dis-
cuss the standard of review the Court formulates to judge the permis-
sibility of this infringement. Finally, this section will evaluate the
Court's application of its standard of review, balancing the first
34 In Illinois State Employees Union, the court noted that "[Ole particular factual
basis for a waiver defense may vary as between different plaintiffit and .. job[s], and
may, at best, limit the scope of relief rather than foreclosing the claim altogether." 473
F.2d at 573 (footnote omitted). See Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975) (Court noted that plaintiff, offered a choice be-
tween a patronage position and a civil service position, voluntarily accepted the patron-
age job "With a full realization of its conditions and hazards.")
Generally, the viability of a claim of waiver of constitutional rights depends on
factual considerations which include the state of mind, background and conduct of the
person claimed to have waived his rights. Every reasonable presumption will be in-
dulged against finding a waiver. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 150
(1949) (privilege against self-incrimination); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65
(1938) (right to counsel). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973)
(requirement of knowing and intelligent waiver limited to those rights which the Con-
stitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial; a "diluted
form" of waiver sufficient to uphold consent search).
35
 Appendix at 41. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
38 Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1966), quoted in Illinois Stale Employees
Union, 473 F.2d at 574 n.25. But see Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 248 (1966) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting in part). Stevens seems to be the only statement of the Court on the
revocability of a waiver of constitutional rights.
37 427 U.S. at 359-60 n.13. But see Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975).
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amendment rights of the individual against the interests of the State.
A. Patronage Dismissals Infringe First Amendment Freedoms
Starting from the premise that patronage dismissals in fact im-
pede the exercise of first amendment freedoms by limiting the public
employee's freedom to express himself in the area of governmental
affairs," the Court sought to identify both the character and the ex-
tent of the infringement on expression and association." In assessing
the character of first amendment infringement, the Court found that
respondents were required to support actively the incoming party in
order to maintain their public employment. 4 " The Court further
found that even where an employee continued surreptitiously to sup-
port his own party, 4 ' the coerced support of the party in power
abridged his freedom of association and limited his freedom to act ac-
cording to his beliefs. These restrictions, in turn; were viewed by the
Court as impeding the free functioning of the electoral process by
depriving the party out of power of potentially substantial sources of
support. 42 Furthermore, in delineating the extent of the infringement,
the Court concluded that these constraints upon the freedoms of ex-
pression and association were not constitutionally insignificant simply
because the restraints denied a benefit—public employment—rather
than a constitutional right." Relying on Perry v. Sindermann," the
Court repeated in Elrod its traditional position that whether the em-
ployee had a right to a government position was irrelevant to the
'8 427 U.S. at 355, See also Buckley v. Video, 424 U.S. I, 14 (1976) (per curiarn).
39 The Court recognized that patronage dismissals themselves could be charac-
terized as an exercise in freedom of association by public officials, but dismissed the
claim in a public employment context. 427 U.S. at 371 & n.27. See note 86 infra.
4(' The necessary "active support" included affiliation with the party, "working for
the election or party candidates, and financial contributions to the party. 427 U.S. at
355.
" The Court observed that the average public employee is not in a position
either to work Ctn. or contribute to more than one political party. Id. Fu•thernmre, even
for the public employee with sufficient time and money to contribute to two parties,
changing party affiliation might impede his ability to vote for his preferred candidates.
See note 52 infra and accompanying text.
42 427 U.S. at 356.
4 ' See note 44 infra. Additionally, petitioners sought to trivialize the constitutional
impact of patronage dismissals by arguing that because no person has a right to public
employment, that benefit may be denied for any reason. 427 U.S. at 360. Petitioners re-
lied in large part upon Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam
by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), despite both the absence of precedential
value of such an affirmance, see Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972), and the out-
right repudiation of the Richardson rationale in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571 (1972). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise qf the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 HAM'. L. RE:v. 1439, 1458.64 (1968).
" 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, the Court conclusively dismissed an argument
similar to that advanced in Elrod, holding that a college professor who had been em-
ployed at the same institution under a series of one-year contracts might be able to
demonstrate a "property" interest in continued employment under the due process
clause through proof of a de facto tenure system at the school. M. at 602-03.
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question whether the state could dismiss an employee from the gov-
ernment position for the exercise of that employee's first amendment
freedoms.45 Noting that "blights are infringed both where the Gov-
ernment fines a person a penny for being a Republican and where it
withholds the grant of a penny for the same reason," the Court ob-
served that the conditions imposed by the Government need not be
quantitatively severe in order to be constitutionally significant."
Furthermore, as the ratio of public to private employment increases,
the Court noted that both the number of individuals affected and the
degree of inhibition felt by the individual increases. 47 The Court thus
concluded that patronage dismissals are constitutionally significant
limitations on first amendment freedoms of expression and
association" which have adverse implications for the operation of the
electoral process."
The dissent, on the other hand, attempted to minimize the con-
ceded infringement of first amendment rights by advancing two ar-
guments. First, the dissent observed that the infringement denied no
public employee his right to vote freely. 5° Second, the dissent asserted
that despite the infringement on their freedom of expression, public
45 427 U.S. at 360-61. In Perry, the Court had observed:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made it clear that even
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and
even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of
reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.
It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitu-
tionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom of speech.
For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his con-
stitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those free-
doms would in effect he penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to 'produce a result which [it) could not command directly.'
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutional
rights is impermissible.
408 U.S. at 597,
1" 427 U.S. at 359-60 n.13.
"See id. The Court's concern, however, with the economic realities of unem-
ployment seems to cloud the basic constitutional issue rather than to darify it. lf, as the
Court maintains, the government may not impose even quantitatively minor unconstitu-
tional conditions on a benefit, there seems to be no reason for the Court to examine the
issue of coercion in pragmatic terms. Moreover, by discussing the constitutional signifi-
cance of these concerns in the same footnote with its discussion of waiver, the Court
appears to recognize the analytical similarity between these issues. Id. In the context of
waiver, any coercion felt by the individual need not be particularly significant to render
the waiver inoperative. See, e.g., Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968). Cf.
notes 28-37 supra and accompanying text.
48 The freedom of association has consistently been held to include the unfet-
tered "right to associate with the political party of one's choice ...." Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Sweeny v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). See gen-
erally Fellman, Constitutional Rights of Association, 1961 THE Sul'. CT. REV. 74, 104-108.
" 427 U.S. at 356.
5" 427 U.S. at 388 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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employees may continue to speak freely on "some political issues.""
Neither of these arguments, however, appears to comport with
political realities. Coerced party affiliation may directly affect the pub-
lic employee's voting rights in states holding closed primaries. 52
Furthermore, even where coerced active support of the incumbent
does not impinge on a narrowly-conceived voting right, it effectively
negates the public employee's vote for the party out of power by sol-
iciting added votes for the incumbent. Thus, the dissent's position that
the practice of patronage dismissals does not infringe on voting rights
seems unrealistic. Moreover, the dissent's assertion that public em-
ployees remain free to speak freely on "some political issues" is mis-
leading. The employee's "active support" of the party in power re-
quired to maintain his employment effectively forecloses his discussion
of most partisan issues, since any expression of opposition—or even
neutrality—to positions taken by the party in power may likely result
in the termination of the patronage employee's position. 53 While an
employee still may discuss nonpartisan political issues, in practice
these are relatively insignificant." Thus, the dissent's position would
appear to allow the state to foreclose the public employee's right to
speak freely on the very issues which may concern him most.
Moreover, the arguments raised by the dissent do not address the
conclusion of the Court that any infringement on protected associa-
tional freedoms may be constitutionally impermissible, but concentrate
instead on the quantitative aspects of that infringement. 55
B. Formulation and Application of the Standard of Review
Having identified significant encroachments on first amendment
freedoms, the Court in Elrod then formulated the appropriate
standard of review to assess the permissibility of these encroachments.
The Court noted that while the first amendment freedoms are not
51 Id.
"The Supreme Court has recognized a State's right to hold closed primaries.
Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Stipp. 837, 850 (I). Conn. 1976), alp; 97 S.Ct. 516 (1976)
(mem.),
53 See 427 U.S. at 359.
54 See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 107 n.4 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Black, dissenting from the majority opinion upholding the Hatch
Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), prohibitions on political activity of civil service em-
ployees, noted that the statutory exception permitting participation in campaigns involv-
ing questions not specifically identified with any political party, Act of July 19, 1940, ch.
640, 54 Stat. 767, 772, excepted political issues whose "importance and number ... are
obviously very small." 330 U.S. at l07 n.4 (Black, J., dissenting). The Hatch Act is pres-
ently codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7327 (1970).
" The dissent maintains that "[Ots intrusion, while not insignificant, must be
measured in light of the limited role of patronage hiring in most government employ-
ment," 427 U.S. at 388 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court's comment on the role of
government employment in the American economy, id. at 359.60 n.13, may be viewed
as an attempted rebuttal to this argument. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying
text.
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absolute," any significant impairment of these freedoms must survive
exacting scrutiny." When the exacting scrutiny standard of review is
invoked, the government must demonstrate that the challenged
practice furthers vital government objectives, that the gain to these
objectives outweighs the loss to the protected freedoms, and that there
are no alternative means for the satisfaction of the government
objectives which are less restrictive of' first amendment rights." In
Elrod, both the plurality and the dissent claimed that in balancing the
interests of the State against the interests of the individual, they
intended to weigh the challenged government practice against first
amendment freedoms without regard for their views on the
desirability of patronage as a political institution. 5 " Maintenance of
such normative objectivity, however, seems problematic when the test
requires the determination whether the benefit to vital government
objectives outweighs the loss to individual freedoms and is the least
restrictive means to the government ends. The subjectivity inherent in
a test with such imprecise and value-laden variables has long been
recognized." The perceived value of patronage, therefore, will in
large measure determine the outcome of the balancing test."'
5B
 427 U.S. at 360. See, e.g., United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 95 n.30 (1947).
57 427 U.S. at 362. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 25 (1976) (per curiatn);
NAACP v. Alabama ex ret Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
427 U.S. at 363. This is the standard most frequently applied in first amend-
ment cases. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See generally United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 598 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But cf.
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 n.20 (1967) (Declining to weigh individual
freedom of association against state interest in national security, the Court struck down
the challenged statute as overbroad).
59 See 427 U.S. at 354. See generally, id. at 377 n.1, 381-82 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(justice Powell, recognizing that the difficulty in formulating judicial standards may bar
justiciability, suggests that the inability to delineate standards was not present in the
context of patronage dismissals.).
""See Illinois State Employees Union, 473 F.2d at 570. This is particularly true
where the challenged government practice is patronage, an institution which has always
evoked ambivalent responses. See note 61 inji.a.
Much of the commentary on the balancing process employed in the first
amendment area has focused on the subjectivity of the test. See, e.g., Ely, Flag Desecra-
tion: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis,
88 H A L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE
L. J. 1424, 1440-43 (1962); Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?--A Reply to Professor Men-
delson, 51 CAI_ L. REV. 729, 747-49 (1963). But cf. Mendelson, On the Meaning of' the First
Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Cu.. L. REv. 821, 825-26 (1962); Mendelson, The
First Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV. 479,
481-2 (1964) (upholding the rationality of the balancing test).
" Both the plurality and the dissent, for example, feel obligated to discuss the
role of political patronage in American history. 427 U.S. at 353-55, 377-380.
Generally, political patronage has been condemned for its contribution to gov-
ernment inefficiency and its tendencies' toward corruption. 427 U.S. at 354, 379. See
notes 63-69 infra and accompanying text. On the other hand, from its inception the sys-
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To offset the weighty interests of first amendment freedoms of
expression and association, petitioners Maintained that the practice of
patronage dismissals served three vital government objectives, the ad-
vancement of which justified encroachment on first amendment
freedoms." 2
 They contended that patronage insured effective government_
and the efficiency of public employees; that it. guaranteed the political
loyalty of public employees; and that it operated to preserve the democratic
process of the American political system. Recognizing the significance of
these State objectives, the Court nonetheless found in each case that pat-
ronage dismissals either did not. advance the State objective sufficiently to
outweigh the encroachment. on first amendment rights, or it did not consti-
tute the least restrictive means to the end sought.
1. The Need for Government Effectiveness and Public Employee Effi-
ciency.
Petitioners maintained that patronage dismissals were necessary
to promote government effectiveness and employee efficiency because
employees who do not share the political persuasion of the party in
power have no motivation to perform efficiently," 3 and that the
employees who actively support the in-party have a positive incentive
to perform well." The Court conceded that government efficiency
was a legitimate State interest, 65 but concluded that mere party
tern of patronage has played a democratizing role in American politics by providing ac-
cess to the political system for groups which otherwise had been excluded. See A.
SCHLESINGER, THE AGE of JACKSON 45-47 (1945); C. Fist', THE CIVIL. SERVICE AND TILE
PATRONAGE (1904 ed.). But see M. & S. TowilIN, To Till.: VIGYOR 73-76 (1971) (tokenism
in black patronage). Moreover, through its distribution of material and psychological
rewards, the patronage system has tended to fill very real social needs, including com-
pensation for deficiencies in government income maintenance programs. See Merton,
The Latent Functions of the Machine, reprinted in E. BANFIELD, URBAN GOVERNMENT
223-233 (1969); CI W. RIORDAN, PLUNKITT TAMMANY HALL 91-98 (1963) (case study
of one political boss in action). For a comprehensive discussion of the institution of
political patronage, see United States Civil. SERVICE COMMISSION, HISTORY Or 'ELIE
FEDERAL CIVIL, SERVICE, 1789 - ro TILE PRESENT (1941); C. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND
THE PATRONAGE (1904 ed.).
el
 Petitioners also argued that the employer's freedom of speech should be added
to the balance on the side of upholding patronage dismissals, relying on Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1944), and N.L.R.B. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 314
U.S. 469, 477 (1941). Brief for Petitioners at 26-28. The Court considered the argu-
ment briefly and dismissed it, distinguishing between the rights of private employers
and public employers. 427 U.S. at 371 & n.27. See note 86 infra. The Court might also
have added that even in a private employment context, Collins and Virginia Electric
Power would have provided questionable support for petitioners in Elrod, since the
Court in Collins, after recognizing in a labor context the first amendment rights of em-
ployers, added in dictum; "When to this persuasion other things are added which bring
about coercion, or give it that character, the limit of the right has been passed." Collins,
323 U.S. at 537-38. Since the Court in Elrod had already found coercion, presumably it
could also have found that the "lime had been passed in Elrod. See notes 38-55 supra
and accompanying text.
" 427 U.S. at 364.
64 Id at 366.
85 See id.
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affiliation, without more, was an insufficient barometer of either
actual or projected performance." The Court added that wholesale
patronage dismissals may in fact contribute to government inefficiency
by removing most of the experienced government employees from
service before trained replacements are available." In addition, the
Court noted that there was a less restrictive means of achieving
government efficiency through public employee dismissals because the
right to dismiss for cause remained available to remove any employee
whose performance was inadequate." The Court thus determined
that patronage dismissals may not advance the State objective of
government efficiency at all, let alone advance the objective
sufficiently to offset the loss to individual freedoms."
2. The Need to Insure the Political Loyalty of Public Employees
In addition to maintaining government efficiency, petitioners ar-
gued that patronage dismissals were essential to insure the political
loyalty of employees. They distinguished the need for employee polit-
ical loyalty from the need for government efficiency on the theory
that since the electorate had sanctioned a change in administration,
the policies of the new officeholders should not be impeded by hold-
overs from the previous administration. 7° Conceding the significance
of this justification, the Court determined that limiting patronage
dismissals to the discharge of policymaking public officials was sufficient
to advance the state interest, 7 ' because only policymakers exercise suf-
" The Court analogized this conclusion to its refusal to assume that simple
membership in an association evidences an individual's intent to further its illegitimate
aims. Id. at 365-66. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606-08 (1967)
(membership in the communist party).
67
 427 U.S. at 364 n.18. Even the dissenters conceded that political patronage in
general and patronage dismissals in particular have not been shown to advance the
cause of government efficiency. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., dissenting). Historically, the inef-
ficiency which political patronage introduced into any level of government was a major
motivation for the introduction of civil service and merit systems of public employment.
Id. Hut see C. FISH, THE CIVIL. SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 151-56 (1904 ed.).
This negative impact of patronage upon government efficiency was used by the
Court to distinguish Elrod from cases upholding the validity of the Hatch Act, see note
54 supra, which, in the Court's view, advanced government efficiency. United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1947); United States Civil Service Contru'n v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 555 (1973).
" 427 U.S. at 366.
" Id.
7" Id. at 367.
TI Id. The Court did not discuss the question whether positions which might re-
quire the personal rather than the political loyalty of employees would justify dismissals
for partisan reasons. In his concurring opinion, however, justice Stewart noted that the
Court's holding referred only to dismissal from "nonpolicymaking, nonconfideniicd" po-
sitions. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). In addition, earlier cases might support the propos-
ition that dismissals from confidential positions should fall outside the Elrod rule. See
Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133, 1136 (7th Cir. 1975); Illinois Slate Employees Union, 473
F.2d at 574; cf. Pickering v, hoard of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 570 n.3 (1968) (noting
that completely correct public statements might furnish a permissible ground for dis-
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ficient responsibility to be able to impede the incoming party's
policies." The Court in Elrod sought to provide guidelines to facilitate
the classification of particular positions by indicating that a position in
which the duties are broad and poorly defined, and in which the em-
ployee is required to act as an advisor or to formulate plans for the
implementation of broad goals is more likely to be a policymaking
position." Where the employee has nondiscretionary duties with
well-defined and limited objectives, the position is more likely to be
considered a nonpolicymaking position. 74
By adopting these criteria, the Court has placed all public em-
ployment positions on a policymaking continuum. 75 At one end of the
continuum are the purely menial positions clearly covered by the
holding in Elrod." At the other end are the purely executive positions
clearly outside the holding in Elrod. 77 As a particular position ap-
proaches the center of the continuum, however, the standards become
more difficult to apply." In Elrod, the Court indicated that it is the
missal from positions in which there is a great need for confidentiality); Sprague v.
Fitzpatrick, 412 F. Supp, 910, 915-19 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (court dismissed complaint
brought by first assistant district attorney challenging nonpatronage dismissal following
plaintiff's public criticism of the district attorney). But cf. Rampey v. Allen, 501 F.2d
1090, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975). It is not clear, how-
ever, to what extent the conlidential-nonconfidential distinction mirrors the line 'be-
tween policytnaking and nonpolicymaking positions,
" 427 U.S. at 367.
" Id. at 368.
" Id. at 367-68.
"These criteria were first enunciated by the Seventh Circuit in Illinois State Em-
ployees Union, 473 F.2d at 578 (Campbell, J., concurring). See American Fed. of State,
County and Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 542, 280 A.2d 375, 381-82 (1971)
(Barbieri, J., dissenting).
" See Illinois State Employees Union, 473 F.2d at 563, 574 (building employees, cler-
ical workers, license examiners, janitors, elevator operators or school teachers); Ameri-
can Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa, 527, 543, 280 A.2d 375,
382 (1971) (Barbieri, J„ dissenting) (highway workers).
"See Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2c1 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1976) (museum regent); In-
diana State Employees Ass'n v. Negley, 365 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Ind. 1973), affd 501
F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1974). In Negley, plaintiffs were "consultants" arid "coor-
dinators" in the Indiana Department ()I' Public Instruction, Supervisor of Adult Edtica-
, don, and Director of the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program, and were all found by
the district court to be "either ... policy-making employees or ... exercising the public
functions of the Department." 365 F. Supp. at 227-30, 232.
" The characterization of some positions as policymaking or nonpolicymaking
may be extremely difficult in some cases. Would, for example, an assistant district at-
torney he a policymaker? A deputy sheriff? Both positions may entail a number of re-
sponsibilities, and the occupants may occasionally act as advisors, but the area of re-
sponsibilities and advice may be quite limited. cf 427 U.S. at 367-68. Each case may
thus present unique factual considerations requiring close analysis of prior judicial,
legislative and administrative determinations. See, e.g., Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2c1
1349, 1357, 1359 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975) (upholding dismissal
of manager of State Liquor Store); Gould v. Walker, 356 F. Stipp. 421, 425 (N.D. Ill.
1973) (mem.) (upholding dismissal of an executive assistant).
Previous analogous federal classifications may be helpful. Thus, section 701(1) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(f) (Stipp. V 1975) defines
"employee" as not including "any person chosen by [a public official] to be on (that
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nature, rather than the number of responsibilities which is critical to a
finding that a particular position is a "policymaking" position." Thus,
mere characterization of a position as "supervisory" may not be suffi-
cient to remove it from the interdiction of patronage dismissals." The
Court in Elrod has mitigated some of these difficulties in drawing the
distinction between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions for
the individual employee by requiring the state to prove that the posi-
tion was a policymaking position once the employee has demonstrated
a political foundation for his discharge. 8 ' This allocation of the bur-
den of proof follows from the Court's position that the government
had the initial burden of demonstrating "an overriding interest ... to
validate an encroachment on protected interests ...."82
 Thus the
Court has concluded that those who are responsible for making or
implementing policy may be dismissed for political reasons, but has
provided only broad guidelines for determining whether a particular
position falls within those categories.
3. The Need to Preserve the Democratic Process of the American
Political System.
Petitioners advanced the preservation of the democratic process
as a third justification for patronage dismissals." The Court, while
granting the constitutional significance of this goal, questioned
whether patronage dismissals were inherently necessary to its preser-
vation. The Court observed first that patronage practice was not wide-
spread prior to Andrew Jackson's administration, 84
 and second, that
official's] personal staff, or an appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate ad-
visor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office." See,
e.g., Gearhart v. Oregon, 410 F. Stipp. 597, 598-601 (D. Ore. 1976) (Deputy Legislative
Counsel was not an exempt employee); Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriffs Dept, 395 F.
Supp. 1307, 1310 (W.D. La. 1975) (Deputy Sheriff not "employee"). See 5 C.F.R. §
213.3301 el seq. (1976). (Civil Service classification scheme identifying "[plositions of a
confidential or policy-determining character").
7° 427 U.S. at 367-68.
"Id. ("Employee supervisors . . may have many responsibilities, but those re-
sponsibilities may have only limited and well-defined objectives.")
81 Id. at 368.
" 2 Id.,
83 1d.
"4 Id. at 353. In fact, the institution of political patronage in general and pat-
ronage dismissals in particular predate even the Articles of Confederation in American
history, evident in New York and Pennsylvania prior to 1780 "where it became custom-
ary, at each election, for the victorious party to turn all adherents of the opposition
party out of their positions," UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HisToav OF rile
FEDERAL. CIVIL SERVICE, 1789 TO THE PRESENT 4 (1941). On the federal level, patronage
dismissals gained acceptance somewhat later. President Washington abhorred patronage
dismissals and made no such discharges, see L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 287 (1948),
though his hiring practices indicate a more favorable attitude toward patronage in gen-
eral. See 427 U.S. at 378 (Powell, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the practice gained cur-
rency during the administrations of Adams and Jefferson, see C. FIMI, THE CIVIL
SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 19-29 (1904 ed.), and after the accession of Jackson the
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the virtual abolition of patronage employment in some states with ex-
tensive merit systems has apparently not eroded the democratic pro-
cess in those states." Moreover, the Court indicated that the end of
patronage dismissals may in fact strengthen the democratic process by
encouraging the exercise of first amendment freedoms on the part of
public employees. 8 " The dissent, on the other hand, agreed with
petitioners' contention that American party politics depends on politi-
cal patronage. Recognizing that local parties generate support primar-
ily through the distribution of rewards such as public employment,
the dissenters concluded that patronage dismissals sufficiently advance
the state interest in preserving the democratic process to justify the
conceded encroachment on first amendment freedoms." As in the
Hatch Act cases, the political well-being of the republic, the dissent
concludes, permits limitations on first amendment freedoms."
At bottom, the disagreement between the plurality and the dis-
sent in the potential impact of patronage dismissals simply reflects
their differing attitudes toward the value of political patronage, which
has generated both desirable and undesirable forces in the American
democratic process."" Faced with the necessity of subordinating some
first amendment interests—patronage dismissals—to other first
amendment. interests—freedom of expression and association," the
balancing of the competing interests splits the Court. The plurality is
not convinced that any of the three interests advanced in support of
patronage dismissals is sufficient to outweigh the losses to first
amendment freedoms. The dissent, on the other hand, envisions the
possibility of sufficient political destabilization to tip the balance in
favor of permitting patronage dismissals. In Fact, the ultimate resolu-
patronage dismissal became commonplace. See A. SmILESINCER, THE ACE OF JACKSON
45-47 (1945).
"5
 427 U.S. at 369,
"" See id, The Court found that this conclusion was consistent with the cases sus-
taining the validity of the Hatch Act on the grounds that the "Idubordination of some
First Amendment activity was permissible to protect [the core interests of individual be-
lief and association]." See notes 54, 56 supra. In Elrod, the Court ruled that the subordi-
nation of "other First Amendment activity"—pant mage dismissals—was "not only
permissible, but mandated by the First Amendment." 427 U.S. at 371. This charac-
terization of patronage dismissals themselves as the exercise of first amendment rights
is not fully developed in Elrod. Arguably, the holding in Etna impinges upon the public
officials' freedom of association by enforced association with unwanted subordinates.
The Court indicates, however, that the public employment context of the associational
ties makes the patronage dismissal impermissible since the public official making the
dismissal is acting not as an individual, but as the state. See id. at. 368-71. See also
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
564-65 (1973); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Court
specifically refused to consider whether' this judgment subordinating political manage-
ment to employee assottiatitmal interests might remain true outside the public em-
ployment context, where the employer would be acting as an individual. 427 U.S. at
371 n.27.
" 7 427 U,S, at 384-85 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"5 See notes 54, 56 supra.
"See note 6 f Supt .
" 427 U.S. at 371. See note 86 sutra.
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tion of this disagreement is likely to be found not in any of the ab-
stractions or analysis of either the Court or the dissent, but in the op-
eration of the rule in Elrod in the American political process. The
next section of this analysis will explore the potential impact of Elrod
on the institution of political patronage and on the American political
process.
III. THE IMPACT OF ELROD V. BURNS
The Elrod decision has far-reaching potential consequences. for
the American political process. The Court's holding, especially if ex-
tended to other patronage practices such as patronage hiring patterns,
may revolutionize employment practices at all levels of government
and may substantially alter the means by which political parties re-
ward their supporters. Furthermore, there remains the dissenters'
fear that the end of patronage dismissals may have a destabilizing ef-
fect on the entire American party system through the disintegration
of local party organizations. This section will examine the impact of
Elrod on state and local employment practices, on federal employment
practices, and on political parties and the democratic process in gen-
eral.
A. State and Local Government Employment Practices
In addition to ending incoming administrations' wholesale dis-
missals of nonpolicymaking employees, Elrod seems likely to alter state
and local employment practices in a variety of ways. First, it may cur-
tail the attempts of outgoing administrations to protect their support-
ers in public positions. Second, it may cause state and local officials to
make increased use of temporary or short fixed-term positions for
subordinates. Third, it may cause incumbents to scrutinize public em-
ployee performance more closely. Finally, Elrod may cause major
changes in state and local hiring practices.
Prior to Elrod, outgoing officeholders occasionally attempted to
protect their supporters by. extending civil service or merit system
coverage to their supporters' positions before leaving office." In Il-
linois, for example, prior to 1972 all positions in the office of the Sec-
retary of State were exempt from the provisions of the Illinois Person-
nel Code." The Secretary of State in 1972 attempted to extend Per-
sonnel Code coverage" to his employees after first dismissing all
those belonging to the opposition party." The Supreme Court of Il-
linois upheld his right to make such an extension against a constitu-
" See Boner v. Jones, 60 111.2d 532, 535, 328 N.E..2d 548, 550 (1975); New York
Times, 17 Nov. 1976 at Al, A14 co1.1; Chicago Sun Times, March 17, 1972, quoted in
Amicus Brief for Public Citizen at 5a, Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
" ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 127, § 63b104c(2) (Smith-Hurd 1967).
"See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 127, § 636104b (Smith Hurd 1967).
"'See Boner v. Jones, 60 III. 2d 532, 535. 328 N.E.2d 548, 550 (1975).
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tional challenge. 95 Since an incoming administration, under Elrod, may
no longer make wholesale patronage dismissals, the outgoing ad-
ministration would seem to have less incentive to extend merit system
coverage." Still, the uncertainty which surrounds the distinction be-
tween nonpolicymaking and policymaking employees seems to have
caused outgoing officials to continue the practice of extending merit-
system ..protection to some of their supporters as a precautionary
measure." Thus Elrod may have little practical effect on the extension
of merit coverage to state employees.
Incoming officials, no longer able to discharge nonpolicymaking
employees for partisan reasons, may attempt to circumvent the hold-
ing in Elrod through indirect means. Elrod involved nontenured public
employees with no fixed term of employment who were dismissed for
partisan reasons." Thus, state and local officials might seek to elimi-
nate indefinite-term positions, replacing them with fixed-term posi-
tions corresponding with the official's electoral term," or constituting
some fraction of the official's term.'" Thus, when a new party as-
sumed power, incoming officials would not need to dismiss the public
employees, but would simply refrain from renewing their employ-
ment. Moreover, local parties controlling particular areas may actually
prefer to distribute short-term positions, because such positions appear
to maximize the political pressure felt by the individual employee.` °t
The political pressures felt by the individual employees also may not
diminish over time, since temporary appointees, no matter how long
they have occupied their positions, may not be able to assert a pattern
of re-employment to avoid dismissal."' The non-renewed employee
" Id. at 537-38, 328 N.E.2d at 551. However, the Court also invalidated an ac-
companying discriminatory examination system. Id. at 540-41, 328 N.E.2d at 552.
"" Merit-protected employees, of course, will continue to have more protection
than non-merit employees, since non-merit employees may still' be discharged for any
reason which does not infringe upon their constitutional rights. See 427 U.S. at 366.
97 Fearing federal-levet patronage dismissals by the incoming administration of
President Carter, some federal supervisors apparently recently engaged in reclassifying
federal employees into Civil Service positions. See New York Times, 17 Nov. 1976 at
Al, Al4 col. 1.
" See 427 U.S. at 350-51.
" See, e.g., Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1309
(W.D. La. 1975) (Deputy Sheriff).
1 "" Short, fiXed-term or "temporary" positions are already in use in a number of
localities. In Chicago, for example, "temporaries" may hold their positions for renewa-
ble 180-day periods. Estimates indicate that nearly 40% of Chicago's public employees
are temporaries, and that this constituted one of Mayor Daley's prime patronage tools.
See M. & S. Tot.citiN, To . 111E VICTOR 40-41 (1970).
While the use of temporaries might seem inconsistent with the attempts by local
parties to cement their supporters in power, both major parties recognize the role of
political patronage and historically have cooperated to perpetuate the institution. See W.
RIORDAN, PLUNKITI' OF TAMMANY HALL. 37-40 (1963).
1 " See M. & S. TOLCII1N, To rilE VICTOR 40-41 (1970) (In Chicago, "fs)ome polit-
ically active employees have held these 180-day temporary jobs for twenty years ....").
""See Roberts v. Parker, 52 App. Div. 2d 651, —, 381 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557
(1976) (mem.). But see Gabriel v. Benitez, 390 F. Supp. 988, 992-93 (D.P.R. 1975), alp,
541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976) (as modified on other grounds).
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may face serious obstacles of proof in the absence of explicit political
motivation for his discharge. 113 It would seem, then, that if local par-
ties increasingly resort to short, fixed-term positions, partisan pres-
sures may actually increase in the wake of Elrod.
In addition to changing the terms of public employment, public
officials may attempt to circumvent Elrod by subjecting holdover em-
ployees affiliated with the party out of power to increased scrutiny in
their job performance. The Court in Elrod explicitly upheld the right
of public officials to dismiss subordinates for cause.'" If increased
scrutiny in fact occurs, its effect might be to increase government effi-
ciency. Ironically, this serves one of the government objectives
petitioners advanced in Elrod for the continuation of the practice of
patronage dismissals.'" In view of the Court's concern with govern-
ment efficiency, it would seem that the employee rightfully dismissed
for cause seeking equitable relief would gain little by asserting that he
was subjected to greater scrutiny than other employees.'" Thus the
Court's holding in Elrod is likely to tempt public officials to examine
more closely the performance of government employees. Regardless
of motive this result may actually improve government operations
since it is not likely to endanger the careers of competent public em-
ployees.
While not encompassed by the holding of Elrod, there is reason
to believe that the Court is likely to hold patronage hiring practices
equally impermissible. Significantly the court discussed each of the
justifications advanced by petitioners in terms of patronage generally
rather than specifically in terms of patronage distnissals. 107 Since an
attack on patronage hiring practices by a person denied public em-
ployment seems likely to evoke the same government interests in re-
sponse, the Court's. ultimate resolution of the question in favor of
those denied public employment for partisan reasons seems certain.
Furthermore, the Court's position that the government may not deny
a benefit to an individual for an impermissible reason 168 would seem
to apply equally to the initial denial of public employment for partisan
reasons, for the applicant for a government position will feel the same
pressure to conform in his views that the Court struck down in Elrod."9
Even the dissent conceded that individuals denied public em-
ployment as a result of their political affiliation could assert first amend-
ment interests more legitimately than the plaintiffs in Elrod because, not
103 One federal court has attempted to meet this problem by allowing circumstan-
tial evidence of politically-motivated dismissals. Gabriel v. Benitez, 390 F. Supp. 988,
993 (D.P.R. 1975), affd, 541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976) (as modified on other grounds).
2 " 427 U.S. at 366.
1 " See notes 63-69 supra and accompanying text.
toe Cf. 427 U.S. at 365-66.
I " Id. at 364-69.
1 ° 9 Id. at 360-61. See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
'°9 See The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HAIM L. REV. 56, 194-96 (1976). Even
prior to Elrod, the Fourth Circuit had recognized this possibility. Nunnery v. Barber,
503 F.2d 1349, 1358 (4th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975).
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having accepted patronage employment, the State could not seek to in-
voke the doctrine of waiver against them)" The dissent's analysis of the
constitutional validity of patronage practices is sufficiently broad to in-
clude patronage hirings as well as dismissals, and it. seems clear that the
dissenters would have upheld patronage hiring had Elrod presented the
question directly)" justice Stewart, however, explicitly reserved consid-
eration of the question in his concurrence)"
B. Federal Employment Practices.
The rationale of Elrod which invalidated state and local patron-
age dismissals seems equally applicable to the Federal Government) 13
The plurality opinion seems to indicate that justiciability problems
would not bar judicial review lk 4 and that the Court would invalidate
the patronage dismissals of non policymaking federal employees if'
such a case came before it. The Court indicated that if in fact a parti-
san job restriction violates constitutional mandates, then that restric-
tion must be struck down regardless of the level of government apply-
ing it. 15 Such an extension, however, is likely to have but a negligible
impact on actual Federal employment practices, since most federal
employees occupy policymaking positions or are covered by Civil Ser-
vice regulations'' 6 which both protect federal employees and prohibit
much of the partisan political activity required of patronage employees in
Elrod."' Thus, the impact of Elrod upon federal employment practices is
not likely to be large.
"" 427 U.S. at 381 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting). See notes 28-37 supra and accom-
panying text.
'" Indeed, the tenor of the dissent seems to assume that the plurality opinion in-
cludes an indictment of patronage hiring practice and phrases its justification in equally
broad terms. Ser, e.g., 427 U.S. at 385-86. (Powell,.1., dissenting).
"2 1d. at 374 (Stewart, J., concurring),
" 1
 Chief Justice Burger analogized from the discretion which Congress has con-
ferred on cabinet officers in the federal government. over nontertured positions to
argue that a similar discretion should protect state patronage practices from judicial in-
terference. See id. at 376 (Burger. C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissent explicitly re-
served the question. Id. at 383 n.7.
See id. at 352.
" 5 1d. (Mhere can be no impairment of executive power, whether on the slate or
federal level, where actions pursuant to that power are impermissible under the Constitu-
tion.") (emphasis added), Consistent with this position, the Court has traditionally li-
mited the dismissal powers of federal officials on constitutional grounds. See note 27
supra.
"6 One estimate has placed only 6,500 "patronage" jobs at the disposal of the
President. M. & 'ro 'I'llE V IC"I'OR 254 (1970). But see New York Times, 17
Nov. 1976 at. Al.
"'The Court has twice upheld the Hatch Act restrictions on political activity by
public employees. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103-04
(1947). See note 54 supra.. See, e.g., P. Yowls, 1 Pot,rricm. ACTIVITY REP. 12 (1941)
(supervisor found to have selected employees for political reasons should be terminated
Irons service); if C. MARTIN, Jr., 2 POLITICAL ACTIVITY REP. 726, 733 (promotion or
suspension for political reasons is impermissible). Some restrictions of the Hatch Act
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C. The Impact of Elrod on Political Parties and the Democratic Process
The extent to which local politicians may be able to maintain
their control over local organizations after Elrod may depend upon
their ability to manipulate alternative patronage practices while avoid-
ing further judicial intervention. The Court itself identified four al-
ternative forms of political patronage: patronage hiring practices,
government contract distribution, unequal distribution of services
from locality to locality, and judicial. patronage in receiverships, trus-
teeships and refereeships." 8
 The availability of alternative patronage
practices suggests that, on balance, Elrod may not significantly weaken
the institution of political patronage because local officials may be able
to offset their losses with increased use of their remaining sources of
patronage.
Local politicians retain, for example, powers sufficient to exer-
cise indirect control over vast quantities of jobs in the private
sector.'" Because local politicians retain power in such areas as dis-
pensation of government contracts'" and passage of municipal zoning
regulations,' 2 ' they will continue to have substantial influence with
private industry. While this influence is unlikely, as a practical matter,
to produce hiring in private industry along ironclad party lines, 122 en-
terprising local political organizations, in all likelihood, will be able to
secure employment for many of their supporters in private industries
hoping to curry favor with powerful local officials.'"
In addition to the fealty generated by tangible rewards offered
in the form of employment, the continued availability of materials re-
wards other than employment suggests that local parties will not be
also apply to state and local employees "whose principal employment is in connection
with an activity ... financed in whole or in part by [federal] loans or grants ...." 5
U.S.C. § 1501(4), 1502 (Su p. V 1975).
"s 427 U.S. at 353. The dissent indicated that "the inability to formulate judicial
standards" may well preclude review of some of these patronage practices. id. at 377
0.1 (Powell, J., dissenting). See note 25 supra.
"" See, e.g., M. & S. TotcHiN, To THE VICTOR 44 (1970 ed.).
See, e.g., id. at 14-15, 273-77. Even competitive bidding regulations do not al-
ways prevent the dispensation of government contracts on a patronage basis. Id. at 43,
60-61.
To avoid judicial interference with patronage practices, government officials may
make increasing use of their ability to "contract-out" to private industry services which
heretofore have been performed by public employees. The public employees might
then be dismissed with impunity since, so long as financial savings accrued to the state,
dismissed employees would find it difficult to prove that the state was motivated by the
desire to evade either Elrod or state civil service laws. See State ex rel Sigall v. Aetna
Cleaning Contractors of Cleveland, Inc. 47 Ohio App.2d 242, —, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 310,
313, 353 N.E.2d 913, 916 (1974), affd 45 Ohio St. 2d 308, 314-15, 74 Ohio Op.2d 471, 474-
75, 345 N.E.2d 61, 65-66 (1976) (per curiam).
" I See M. & S. TOLCHIN, To THE Vicrox 52-60, 68 (1970 ed.).
1 " A more likely result is party-line hirings at particular times to fill
openings—perhaps created by the award of a new contract. See notes 120-121 supra.
" An action seeking relief in the private employment context, without more,
might reach an entirely different result, based on the involvement of private associa-
tional interests on both sides. See 427 U.S. at 371 & n.27. See also note 86 supra.
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powerless to command future political support. Local officials retain
their control over the distribution of government services and local
party organizations are still in a position to provide a wide range of
material and psychological rewards for their members. 12 " As an at-
tempt to remain influential in the wake of Elrod, many local party or-
ganizations may actually increase their efforts to provide access to of-
ficeholders and to distribute social services.
Ultimately, the impact of Elrod on the American political party
structure, and on the democratic process itself, may rest on the political
abilities of state and local officeholders and political organizations. It
may be true, as the dissent claims, that the plurality in Elrod has taken a
myopic view of the net worth of political patronage to American
politics,' 25 but the dissenters may have seriously underestimated the re-
sourcefulness of the local politician, who wishes to remain in office. 12°
It seems likely for this reason that the Court can proscribe patronage
dismissals for nonpolicymaking public employees without serious dam-
age either to the fabric of American democracy or to the core of the
patronage system. Clearly, the impact of Elrod upon both patronage
and democracy must await further judicial determinations defining
policymaking positions and subjecting alternative patronage practices to
judicial scrutiny.'"
CONCLUSION
The prohibition of patronage dismissals of nonpolicymaking pub-
lic employees has significantly enhanced the ability of the individual
employee to withstand official encroachment on his freedoms of politi-
cal expression and association. In extending this protection, however,
the Court has placed a significant constraint on the ability of the local
political party to distribute material rewards to its supporters. Whether
the local political party can survive this loss without dissipating its base
of support will depend in large measure both upon the talents of the
local leadership and upon the depth and breadth of further judicial
limitations on the parties' freedom to distribute rewards. If the local
124 See note 61 supra.
"5 427 U.S. at 383.
122 See W. RIORDAN, PE.uxhrrr OF TAMMANY HAI.I. 37-38 (1963).
" 7
 Petitioners had argued that one difficulty with a holding that patronage dis-
missals were impermissible would be a vast quantity of litigation brought by virtually
every dismissed non-civil service public employee. Brief for Petitioners at 36-37. During
the course of oral argument, at least Justice Powell seemed quite concerned that the
holding in Elrod might lead to a "flood of litigation." New York Times, Nov. 17, 1976 at
A1, A14, col, I, In• ffict, however, experience in the Seventh Circuit in the wake of
Illinois State Employees Union seems to belie this prediction. From the Illinois Slate Em-
ployees Union decision in 1972 to 1975, only four enforcement proceedings were
brought. Brief for Respondents at 57. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Given the
relatively active role of patronage in Cook County, there is reason to believe that if an
interdiction of patronage dismissals "can be effectively enforced in Cook County, Il-
linois, without a flood of litigation, a judgment [ending patronage dismissals] can be
implemented anywhere." Brief for Respondents at 58.
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political organizations are unable or are judicially prevented from man-
ipulating alternative sources of rewards, the final result of Elrod v.
Burns may be a major re-adjustment in American party politics. By re-
moving the patronage dismissal from the hands of political bosses,
however, the Court has reaffirmed its conviction that the health of the
American polity is found more in the freedom of its members to speak
and think as they choose than in the ability of politicians to grant favors
in return for support.
RICHARD F. RINALDO
Securities Law—Constitutional Law—Implied Waiver of
Eleventh Amendment Immunity under the Securities Acts—Green v.
Utah.' In 1974 plaintiff Maxine Green brought suite in federal district
court against the State of Utah and its Commissioner of Financial In-
stitutions (Commissioner) alleging violation of the antifraud provision
of the Securities Exchange Act of 19M, 3 arising out of the state's reg-
ulation of one of its chartered financial institutions. 4 According to
the complaint, Western States Thrift and Loan (WST) was an indus-
trial loan corporation organized pursuant to Utah statutes,' which is-
sued securities in the form of thrift certificates, passbook accounts,
and debenture bonds' Plaintiff alleged that due to a series of severe
' 539 F.2d 1266 (10th Cir. 1976).
2
 Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of herself and as a class action on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated. Id. at 1268.
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934,	 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1976). 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970) provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ....
Rule 101)-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c)To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
1 539 F.2d at 1268.
5 1d. at 1267-68. See UTAH Conti; ANN. §§ 7-8-I et seq. (1968 Replacement Volume)..
6
 The court assumed arguendo that these were securities within the meaning of
the Securities Acts. 539 F.2d at 1269. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(I), 7840(10) (1970).
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